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Abstract

This thesis uses the historical and structural characteristics of the VenezuelanCuban healthcare program, Mission Barrio Adentro, to identify areas of resource
mismanagement and how such abuses of government capital has negatively affected the
Venezuelan medical system as well as the Cuban healthcare professionals involved.
Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro’s healthcare diplomacy under Mission Barrio Adentro,
which trades Cuban doctors for oil, has failed to provide adequate medical services to the
Venezuelan citizens. Despite the drop in oil prices, the Venezuelan government has
continued to funnel money into Mission Barrio Adentro using PDVSA revenues. Such
reliance on oil wealth and the continuation of increased social funding in the face of
economic hardship has contributed to the near collapse of the current Venezuelan medical
system. The elimination of Chávez’s overly politicized policies and the development of
management structures to promote transparency around government expenditures will aid
in creating more efficient and beneficial social programs for the Venezuelan people.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Present State
Oil has played a crucial role in the history of Venezuela even before Columbus
sailed to the Americas, where indigenous peoples used the hydrocarbons that escaped to
the surface of the land.1 For former Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, oil was
essential in accomplishing his plans, which often included the use of large amounts of oil
wealth to fund social programs, called missions. Chávez’s missions greatly appealed to
the majority of Venezuelans who lived in poverty. Mission Barrio Adentro, one of Hugo
Chávez’s largest social missions, perfectly exemplifies Venezuela’s exploitation of
natural resource revenues for political gain. Furthermore, the results of the program have
been mostly underwhelming. The blind dependence on the high oil prices has put
Venezuela in a turbulent economic state. Chávez’s socialist policies have been met by
extreme opposition from industrialized nations, such as the United States and from fellow
Venezuelans who have recognized the country’s vulnerability to changing gas prices.
Despite the strong resistance to Chávez’s anti-capitalist ideologies, support among the
impoverished population has allowed his Bolivarian Revolution to continue.
Venezuela sits on top of the world’s largest proven oil reserves. However, the
country currently faces the worst economic crisis in its history. In 2014, Venezuela had
1

Wilpert, Gregory. "The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela."
Venezuelan Analysis. Last modified August 30, 2003. Accessed November 29, 2016.
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/74.
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298 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, much of which comes from the Orinoco belt,
containing 220.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.2 Oil revenues make up most of the
value of total exports. The $3.58 billion of petroleum exports make up 95 percent of the
country’s total export revenue.3 Due to the large presence of oil within the country, the
state-run oil company, PDVSA, has had extreme influence on the country’s economic,
political, and social conditions. However, as world oil prices began to collapse, so did
Petróleos de Venezuela. Crude prices fell to the low thirties per barrel. As a result, 2015
incomes for PDVSA fell almost 41 percent at $72.2 billion from $121.9 billion in 2014.4
One might assume a decrease in revenues would result in a decrease of social
spending from the state-owned oil company. However, contributions to Chávez’s social
programs increased over 72 percent in 2015. Funding for social development in 2015
amounted to approximately $9.2 billion compared to $5.3 billion the year before.5 The
mismanagement of oil revenues accompanied by the drop in oil prices has caused the
country to enter a severe economic decline.
Mission Barrio Adentro, the healthcare program that trades Cuban doctors for oil,
has failed to provide adequate medical services to the Venezuelan citizens. Instead,
2

Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela, 2015.
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=VEN.
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Venezuela Facts and Figures. Accessed November 26, 2016.
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm.
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"Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. and Subsidiaries (PDVSA) Consolidated Financial
Statements." December 31, 2015. PDF,
http://www.pdvsa.com/interface.sp/database/fichero/free/10853/1719.PDF
5
Ibid.
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people are dying from preventable illnesses. Medical equipment is broken, medications
are sparse, and the rolling blackouts have left hospitals without electricity and clean
water. Regardless of the Venezuelan government's supposed commitment to the health of
its citizens, the country currently faces a severe humanitarian crisis, which has left many
without proper medical care despite the implementation of Mission Barrio Adentro.

1.2 The Relevance of Mission Barrio Adentro
This thesis uses the historical and structural characteristics of the VenezuelanCuban healthcare program, Mission Barrio Adentro, to identify areas of resource
mismanagement and how such abuses of government capital has adversely affected the
Venezuelan medical system as well as the Cuban healthcare professionals involved. It
seeks to prove Mission Barrio Adentro has had a negative, rather than favorable, effect on
Venezuelan citizens as well as the Cubans working in Venezuela due to unsustainable
funding by Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. revenues and ineffective organization of the
program by the government. The use of PDVSA revenues to finance Mission Barrio
Adentro has contributed to the economic distress Venezuela currently faces.
The future of Venezuelan social missions is uncertain, just as the future of
political and economic conditions continue to falter under the control of Nicolas Maduro.
The government must learn from Mission Barrio Adentro as it implements subsequent
social programs and healthcare initiatives. The death of Hugo Chávez in 2013 and Fidel
Castro in 2016, may cause relations between Venezuela and Cuba to change drastically in
3

the near future. Castro and Chávez were more than political allies, they were friends.
Because both of the founding leaders of Barrio Adentro are gone and Venezuela can no
longer provide monetary support for the island, the two governments may abandon
Mission Barrio Adentro altogether, despite evidence it never provided medical care to the
extent that both governments claimed. If the Cuban government no longer practices
medical diplomacy, Venezuela must consider new mechanisms to encourage more
Venezuelans to obtain a medical degree to practice in poorer areas instead of moving to
another country for a higher wage in a safer environment. Even if Venezuela and Cuba
maintain diplomatic relations, Venezuela must alter the amounts of oil it provides Cuba
so its value matches the quality of healthcare provided. The government also must alter
the allocation of resources so the medical centers it constructs remain staffed and in
working condition. The government should diversify its economy so the change in oil
prices does not drastically affect the quality of the country’s social programs.
Chapter two explains the origins of the Cuban-Venezuelan coalition as well as the
ways in which Cuban medical diplomacy has played a role in sustaining that relationship.
Chapter three explores the details of Mission Barrio Adentro. It explains the lofty goals
of the program versus the failed results. Chapter four builds upon the previous three
chapters to confirm that the overuse of Venezuela’s oil revenues and the politicization of
the program to gain popular support resulted in the failure of Mission Barrio Adentro.
The chapter explains the possible political changes Venezuela faces as well as the steps
the country must take to alleviate its health crisis.
4

Chapter 2: The Cuban-Venezuelan Coalition

The Cuban-Venezuelan connection emerged four decades before Hugo Chávez
became president, about a year after Venezuela had successfully overthrown Marcos
Perez Jimenez. Fidel Castro took his first trip outside of Cuba to Venezuela just weeks
after his success in overthrowing Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship. While in Venezuela,
Fidel Castro asked the then Venezuelan president, Rómulo Betancourt, for a $300 million
loan and oil to fund a “game with the gringos.”6 Although Fidel Castro believed
Betancourt would share his aversion toward the United States as well as embrace the idea
of a completely integrated Latin America, the Venezuelan president declined the request.
40 years after Betancourt objected to Castro’s proposition, Hugo Chávez turned into
Fidel Castro’s most influential supporter. While Chávez saw his relationship with Castro
as a way to achieve approval of his revolutionist tactics, Castro perceived their
relationship as a way to attain mass quantities of oil for his own political goals. As a
result, the two leaders initiated Cuba and Venezuela’s trade of doctors for oil, which
resulted in a large amount of mutual dependence and vulnerability between both
countries as the prices of oil has fluctuated.

6

de Cordoba, José. "The Future of 'Cubazuela.'" Wall Street Journal (New York City),
March 1, 2013. Accessed December 2, 2016.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323884304578328252463429328?mg=i
d-wsj.
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2.1 The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba found itself in a deep economic
crisis. The country’s GDP dropped by approximately 35 percent between 1989 and 1993
and one-fourth of its national income evaporated.7 Many believed the Cuban government
would soon crumble. However, not long after the economic plight of the Special Period
began, Cuba found a new relationship on which the country could depend. Venezuela
under the rule of Hugo Chávez intervened to replace the Soviet Union as Cuba’s primary
source of financial stability. After losing all of the USSR’s subsidized oil imports, Cuba
had a new means of acquiring oil and oil derivatives. Venezuela became a source of vital
aid for Cuba during a time of intense pressure from the United States and the fall of the
Soviet bloc. It resulted in Cuban economic expansion of 11.8 percent by 2005 and the
eventual formation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, also known as ALBA.8
In 2004, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez created the Alternativa Bolivariana para
las Américas, as it is called in Spanish, to substitute the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
sponsored by the United States.9 According to both leaders, the FTAA perpetuated
economic stagnation and facilitated the exploitation of less developed countries. Both
Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro retained strong views against capitalism and U.S.

7

Peters, Philip. "Survival Story: Cuba's Economy in the Post-Soviet Decade." Lexington
Institute. Last modified June 1, 2002. Accessed December 2, 2016.
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/survival-story-cubas-economy-in-the-post-soviet-decade/.
8
Azicri, Max. "The Castro-Chávez Alliance." Latin American Perspectives 36, no. 1
(January 2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648163, 99
9
Ibid., 100
6

imperialism, which they believed was perpetuated by the profit-focused FTAA. However,
the Cuban and Venezuelan missions implemented have been divergent of ALBA’s ideals
because they have led to considerable exploitation of Cuban doctors and Venezuelan
citizens.
The concept of ALBA resembles the philosophies proposed by Ché Guevara in
1965 when he addressed the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria. He opposed “developing
mutually beneficial trade based on prices forced on the backward countries by the law of
value and the international relations of unequal exchange that result from the law of
value.”10 Correspondingly, Castro and Chávez constructed ALBA to recognize the
political, economic, and social asymmetries both countries encountered. Chávez stated
the ALBA initiative existed as “true Latin American and Caribbean integration based on
justice,” and both leaders pledged to “fight to make it happen.”11 The focus of ALBA
advocates for a more socially oriented approach, as opposed to what Castro and Chávez
view as a one-sided, profit maximizing trade block. Paradoxically, programs under
ALBA, such as Mission Barrio Adentro, benefitted both governments at the expense of
its citizens.

10

Guevara, Che. Ché Guevara Reader. Edited by David Deutschmann and María Del
Carmen Ariet. 2nd ed. Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2003, 341.
11
Arreola, Gerardo. "Firman Cuba y Venezuela un abanico de acuerdos sin paralelo"
[Cuba and Venezuela sign a range of agreements without parallel]. La Jornada (Mexico
City, Mexico), December 16, 2004. Accessed November 26, 2016.
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2004/12/16/027n1mun.php.
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The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas attempts to exclude the United States
while unifying countries previously colonized by the Spanish. The alliance embraces
“regionness,” which joins social, political, and institutional components of the Latin
American nations.12 It brings countries like Venezuela and Cuba together and aims for
solidarity against what the organization views as its main opponent: the United States.
The document establishing ALBA delineates the importance of unanimity and liberation
within Latin America by stating:

We affirm that the cardinal principle, which must guide the ALBA, is the widest
solidarity between the peoples of the Latin America and the Caribbean … without
selfish nationalisms or restrictive national policies, which deny the aim to
construct a Great Homeland in Latin America in accordance with the dream of the
national heroes of our emancipating fights.13

According to Chávez and Castro, several criteria were created to obstruct ALBA
from operating on self-interest or profit. The two leaders asserted members of ALBA
could not give nor receive special treatment that takes into account a country’s level of
12

Emerson, Guy. "Institutionalizing a Radical Region? The Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America." Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 19, no. 2
(2013). Accessed November 1, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13260219.2013.853352,
196.
13
Ruz, Fidel Castro, and Hugo Chávez Fría. "Joint Declaration Venezuela-Cuba." In
ALBA-TCP. 2004. Last modified December 14, 2004. Accessed November 1, 2016.
http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/joint-declaration-venezuela-cuba.
8

development.14 Instead, the agreement aims to promote cohesion among the least
developed countries so they may create a region of multilateral trade. The coalition aims
to create social plans for undeveloped countries to combat illiteracy, the inability to
access modern technology, and the absence of sufficient healthcare among poor
citizens.15 It also promotes energy integration among the members in order to establish a
fixed reserve of energy commodities and to deter the dependence on an exclusive oilproducing nation.16
However, it created just that. Venezuela became the major oil producer in the
region, which caused many countries to rely on PDVSA for energy. Despite the appeal
Barrio Adentro had to many Venezuelans living without healthcare, the methods used to
create a “Great Homeland” in Latin America proved ineffective and unsustainable
because of excess dependence on each country for its exports. In the case of Mission
Barrio Adentro, Venezuela became dependent on Cuban doctors. When Cuban doctors
left, Venezuela was not prepared to replace them. Mission Barrio Adentro’s exchange of
doctors for oil combines the emphasis on energy consolidation under ALBA with the
implementation of social programs. The exchange of medical professionals for oil
provided a way in which Cuba could receive more oil that it needed, which allowed it to
resell the oil to other countries for profit. In return, Chávez could appeal to his poorer
constituency, which was desperate for healthcare reform. Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro
14

Ibid.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
15

9

affirmed they created ALBA to serve as a political means to a social end. However, it
materialized as a social instrument to achieve political authority.
Chávez and Castro established various methods of financing in order to
accomplish the social projects put forward by ALBA. The organization formed a bank
with two headquarters located in Venezuela and Cuba, which stemmed from an initial
investment of $1 billion.17 The Bank of ALBA has the function of financing the programs
under the agreement in order to “improve productivity and efficiency, create
technological development … develop projects in social sectors to reduce poverty and
eradicate extreme poverty, ethnic, social, and gender exclusion.”18 A localized trade
currency called the SUCRE, or the Sistema Único de Compensación Regional, emerged
as a method of government-to-government commerce.19 The two countries even used the
SUCRE as a symbol against the United States. Before signing the SUCRE into
legislation, Chávez declared, “Enough with the dictatorship of the dollar, long live the
SUCRE.”20 The SUCRE and the Bank of ALBA store member countries’ currency
reserves. When the Bank of ALBA is not sufficient in financing social projects, the
17

Janice, Kiraz. "Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA) Concludes in
Venezuela." Venezuelan Analysis. Last modified January 27, 2008. Accessed December
2, 2016. https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3104.
18
"Acta fundacional del Banco del ALBA" [Founding Act of the Bank of ALBA].
Petóleos de Venezuela, S.A. Last modified 2005. Accessed November 1, 2016.
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/biblioteca/readdoc.tpl.html&ne
wsid_obj_id=5405&newsid_temas=111.
19
Hirst, Joel D. "A Guide to ALBA." Americas Quarterly. Accessed November 1, 2016.
http://www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article.
20
Gray, Julia. The Company States Keep. New York City, U.S.: Cambridge University
Press, 2013, 132.
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Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, PDVSA, provides capital and oil at
very low prices with relaxed methods of repayment.
While the inclusion of PDVSA in the subsidization of ALBA assists in the
creation of energy integration as specified in the alliance’s founding document, it creates
substantial dependence on the successes of the oil industry within Venezuela. Without
revenue from PDVSA, many countries cannot continue their programs. And without the
economic successes of the member countries, Venezuela and PDVSA will not receive its
payments. Little money is recirculated continue developing PDVSA, because it operates
as another bank for the Venezuelan government, instead of an oil company. Because the
government places large dependence on PDVSA for social programs but does not
reintroduce revenues into the company, not only has the corporation's performance
struggled, but the quality of the social programs has also deteriorated.
Venezuela and Cuba officially began their alliance with the formation of the
Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas. Through the formation of ALBA and its supposed
emphasis on producing social consciousness throughout Latin America, both countries
capitalized on the opportunity to utilize their niches and achieve certain political
advantages. For Cuba, its successful implementation of medical diplomacy allowed the
country to promote its interests with other countries. Venezuela’s wealth of oil has
allowed it to force dependency among the members of ALBA, and take responsibility for
funding social programs prompted by the government under Hugo Chávez.

11

2.2 Cuban Medical Diplomacy
Despite the economic difficulties Cuba faced following the fall of the Soviet
Union as well as the obstacles it faced from both internal and external forces, the
Caribbean country has created a healthcare system praised by many. Soon after the
revolution, Cuba created free healthcare for all citizens. The regime asserted the “health
of the population was a metaphor for the health of the political body.”21 Eventually,
Cuban healthcare transformed into a system that specialists, such as the former director of
the World Health Organization, Dr. Halfdan Mahler, have applauded. Dr. Mahler stated,
“No other country has been as consistent in taking measures towards achieving the goal
of ‘Health for All’ as Cuba.”22 Margaret Chan, the current director general of the World
Health Organization, also praised Cuba’s implementation of preventative medicine and
has requested other countries follow its lead.23 Cuba owes much of its medical success to
the subsidized oil and financial support is has received from the Venezuelan government.
Without Hugo Chávez’s aid, the Cuban medical system, much less the entire Cuban
nation, may not have outlived the fall of the Soviet Union.

21

Feinsilver, Julie M. "Médicos por petróleo: La diplomacia médica cubana recibe una
pequeña ayuda de sus amigos" [Doctors for Oil: Cuban medical diplomacy receives a
little help from its friends]. Neva Sociedad, no. 216 (July/August 2008). PDF, 109
22
Brouwer, Steve. Revolutionary Doctors. New York City, NY: Monthly Review Press,
2011, 45.
23
Hill, Fiona. "Prevention Better than Cure in Cuban Healthcare System." BBC. Last
modified December 13, 2015. Accessed November 1, 2016.
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-35073966.
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The formation of ALBA created an organized and legal approach to extending
Cuban medical diplomacy throughout the world, especially in Latin America.
Nevertheless, it was not ALBA that can take complete responsibility for the
implementation of Cuban medical diplomacy. The Cuban government first applied the
practice a year after Castro obtained power in 1960. The country initially sent medical
crews to Algeria during a civil war with France and to Chile after a damaging
earthquake.24 The government understood it could easily send medical professionals all
over the world, and by doing so, it could acquire political leverage in the countries it
helped. In order to continue sending doctors internationally, the country needed to train
more healthcare professionals. Cuba’s desire to expand its medical diplomacy throughout
the world clearly shaped the successful healthcare system for which the country came to
be known. Despite being eight times as poor as a person from the United States, the
country has eight doctors for every 1,000 citizens, compared to 2.5 in the U.S. and U.K.25
The growth of Cuba’s specialty in medical diplomacy has allowed the country to
strengthen the credibility of the healthcare, which it provides to similarly poor nations
calling on Cuba for medical assistance in exchange for resources or influence.
Despite beginning Cuban medical diplomacy in 1960, Castro could not generate
the influence he desired from the program until his coalition with Hugo Chávez. ALBA
provided the trade, support and financing Cuba required to grow as an exporter of doctors
24

Werlau, Maria C. "Cuba's Health-Care Diplomacy: The Business of Humanitarianism."
World Affairs 175, no. 6 (March/April 2013). http://www.jstor.org/stable/43556164, 57.
25
Hill, Fiona.
13

and medical services. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas provided an agency to
create policies such as Mission Barrio Adentro, Mission Sonrisa, and ELAM. Without
Venezuela’s financial backing of Cuba, Cuba would not have had nearly as much
influence as a result of its medical exports. However, the methods that formed the
exchange of oil for doctors have proved volatile and unsustainable as the prices of oil
drop and Venezuela undergoes a severe economic crisis. Critics have questioned the
quality of healthcare the Cuban government has provided to Venezuela as well as
Venezuela’s compliance in funding a product that does not fulfill its duties.

14

Chapter 3: Mission Barrio Adentro

Once one of the richest countries in Latin America with high growth rates and
extremely low levels of inequality, Venezuela did not question its unsustainable
dependence on oil until the price collapsed in the late 1980s. Although oil prices and
national taxation increased drastically in the years preceding the 1980’s, stagnant
production per capita and volatile financial investments set Venezuela’s economy up for
failure as soon as global oil prices fell. In an attempt to develop policies that fairly
circulate the revenue from oil companies, Venezuela displayed its government's capacity
to greatly magnify levels of debt.
As the price of oil began to fluctuate from the 1970’s to 1996, government
expenditures on health services dropped approximately 40 percent and the country’s
capabilities to provide adequate public health resources failed.26 The economic crisis in
the years preceding Chávez’s presidency left the task of repairing substandard health
facilities to the regional governments, which led to the privatization of most medical
programs. In 1998, a year before Chávez won the presidency, private spending on
healthcare accounted for 68 percent of total health expenditure.27 As a result, 70 percent

26

"Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure), Venezuela." Unpublished
raw data, The World Bank, 2014. Accessed November 21, 2016.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL?end=2014&locations=VE&start=199
7.
27
Ibid.
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of Venezuelans did not have consistent access to healthcare. The combination of poor
medical amenities as well as the lack of accessibility to healthcare presented Hugo
Chávez with reason to completely change the healthcare system.
Knowledge that the over-dependence on oil revenues caused the crippling
economic crisis in the 1980s did not obstruct the Venezuelan government under Hugo
Chávez from once again exercising extreme reliance on the resource to fund various
social programs. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s led to large amounts of
poverty among most of the Venezuelan population. The desperation among many
Venezuelans caused Hugo Chávez’s “21st century socialism” to become very attractive,
regardless of the means by which the government implemented it.
Taking advantage of Cuba’s most valuable form of international diplomacy,
Chávez chose to import the island’s model of public health, which Venezuela funded
through its abundance in natural resource wealth. Hugo Chávez, appealing to the
country’s poor population, based his campaign on redesigning methods of governance
and improving the quality of life among disenfranchised communities. Soon after
winning the elections with an overwhelming majority, Chávez implemented the 1999
Constitution, guaranteeing healthcare as a fundamental right that should be provided by
the state.
In order to promote and develop policies that work toward improving the
conditions of the country’s health services, Venezuela joined Cuba in the Comprehensive
Cooperation Agreement under the auspices of ALBA. The Comprehensive Cooperation
16

Agreement permits Cuba and Venezuela to create a method of exchanging mutually
beneficial goods and services by means of prearranged conditions, operating under shared
political ideologies. The agreement’s six articles detail bilateral projects between the
countries, stating “the participation of public and private sector organizations and entities
of both countries will be considered,” as well as “universities, research bodies and nongovernmental organizations.” Encompassing many areas, such as sports, energy, culture,
agriculture and education, the agreement places most emphasis on the creation of public
health systems throughout the country’s poorest areas. The accord requires Cuba to
provide medical professionals and services to work in impoverished areas of Venezuela.
In exchange, Venezuela must finance the Cuban doctors’ costs of housing, meals, and
transportation as well as provide the Cuban government with oil and its derivatives.

3.1 Barrio Adentro Phase I
To improve the healthcare system Hugo Chávez inherited, the Venezuelan
government began taking measures to slow the healthcare system’s privatization process
and eliminate the obstacles Venezuelan citizens encountered when attempting to receive
medical care. Firstly, Chávez ordered public hospitals to suspend charges for services
received in emergency departments.28 This action set the precedent for complete
dependence on PDVSA to fund Chávez’s missions. Next, the government altered the
28

Armada, Francisco, Carles Muntaner, Haejoo Chung, Leslie Williams-Brennan, and
Joan Benach. "Barrio Adentro and the Reduction of Health Inequalities in Venezuela: An
Appraisal of the First Years." International Journal of Health Services 39, no. 1: 165
17

model of integral healthcare so the organization of primary care was no longer based on
age groups, procedures, and medical specialties of the service providers, but on the needs
of patients.29 With Cuba’s help, primary healthcare centers received new equipment and
infrastructure and the Venezuelan healthcare system began to follow a preventative
approach to medical treatment. Cuba also aided Hugo Chávez in the implementation of
various misiones sociales, or social missions, which the government claimed would
counteract the increasing levels of social and economic inequality. The missions varied
in focus, from healthcare to education.
The largest of these missions includes Mission Barrio Adentro, which strives to
administer free public healthcare to every part of the country that did not already obtain
the medical resources necessary to provide for its citizens. With the supply of Cuban
services and the financial backing of the state-run oil company, PDVSA, the Venezuelan
government began to introduce missions such as Barrio Adentro in areas throughout the
country. 58 Cuban doctors arrived in Venezuela and began working in the poorest areas
of Caracas.30 Faithful to its name, Barrio Adentro (translated to Inside the Neighborhood)
involves Cuban doctors living within the same community in which they work. During
the first phase of Barrio Adentro, the Cuban doctors resided in homes voluntarily
provided by members of the community. The plan calls for every doctor to be
accompanied by a Defensor de la Salud, a Defender of Health, who lives in the same
29

Ibid., 165.
Sanchez, German. Barrio Adentro y otras Misiones Sociales en la Revolucion
bolivariana. Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2005, 10.
30

18

barrio and undergoes training by the Ministry of Health so they may provide basic
support for the doctors.31 Mission Barrio Adentro began establishing the first Health
Committees in the neighborhoods and Cuban medical professionals began to assess the
most prominent ailments among the population. By the end of July, the program had
expanded to almost every state in Venezuela, and more than 4,000 Cuban doctors had
arrived in the country by November.32
The official expansion of Barrio Adentro to the national level occurred in 2004,
after the government analyzed the successes and failures of the initial program. The
government began developing more medical centers at a very high rate, which required
PDVSA to funnel more money into the program. The number of medical centers grew to
almost 3,000 in 2007 from just 13 in 2003.33 More residences were also built for the
increasing number of doctors entering the country from Cuba. Community involvement
increased through the creation of more health committees, which provided medical
education to its citizens. The number of health committees increased from 2,124 in 2003
to almost 8,951 in 2006.34 The exponential increase in construction and stocking of the
centers required PDVSA to funnel more money into the program during a short time
period. Currently, all of the health centers as well as the machinery within them cannot be
31

Telesur (Venezuela). "Barrio Adentro suma más de 704 millones de consultas médicas
gratuitas en Venezuela" [Barrio Adentro adds more than 704 million free medical
consultations in Venezuela]. April 15, 2015. Accessed November 21, 2016.
http://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/12-anos-de-Barrio-Adentro-20150415-0079.html.
32
Sanchez, 12.
33
Armada, 168.
34
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maintained at the current level of PDVSA income. The government directed massive
amount of money into the construction of these areas, but did not save anything to
reinvest.
The number of Cuban medical professionals has also grown immensely since
Barrio Adentro’s beginning. More than 20,000 Cuban medical personnel, including
doctors, nurses, dentists, and other healthcare workers have lived in Venezuela at one
time.35 Cuban medical experts greatly outnumber Venezuelan healthcare providers. In
May of 2005, 14,000 Cuban medical doctors and 3,000 Cuban dentists practiced in
Venezuela versus just 1,000 Venezuelan doctors and 1,000 dentists.
In order to phase out Cuban medical professionals from the Venezuelan labor
force, both governments created universities to educate medical students. Originally, the
presence of Cuba physicians working in Barrio Adentro was expected to last only five
years. To achieve this goal, the Venezuelan government sent medical students to the
Latin American Medical School (ELAM) in Havana. While there, the students participate
in a six-year medical curriculum reserved for low-income students who dedicate
themselves to the practice of medicine in underdeveloped communities within their home
countries.36 The National Training Program for Comprehensive Community Physicians
provides a similar structure of education for students attending one of six Venezuelan
universities. The educational programs depend on Cuban teachers who are practicing
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doctors in the Barrio Adentro program. The goal has been to use the Cuban doctors to
produce the next generation of Venezuelan healthcare professionals. However, Venezuela
has an extreme shortage of doctors and the program has not been sufficient in providing
enough physicians for public practice. The shortage has made Venezuela extremely
dependent on Cuban doctors to carry out the responsibilities of the mission because
Venezuela cannot provide enough medical professionals. As Cuban doctors have left
Venezuela to provide medical aid in other countries, Venezuelan doctors have been left to
care for many more patients than they can handle. Seeing hundreds of patients a day has
left the doctors overworked and underpaid, which deterred Venezuelans from wanting to
become doctors and resulted in a decrease in the quality of care.
The first phase of Mission Barrio Adentro attempts to achieve various guidelines
created in order to successfully provide free healthcare in impoverished areas of
Venezuela. The plan maps out areas of cities from which patients are drawn. Under the
program, each area should have a medical center providing coverage for between 250 and
400 families. However, because of the shortage in doctors, the coverage area actually
includes many more families and some regions do not even have nearly the amount of
access Mission Barrio Adentro originally planned.

3.2 Latter Phases of Mission Barrio Adentro
In order to add to the first phase of Mission Barrio Adentro, Hugo Chávez
decided to implement the second stage of the mission at the end of 2004. The first phase
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of Barrio Adentro involved the implementation of consultation centers and educational
services for the community. Moving forward, the government hoped to create centers that
could provide intensive therapy and emergency care to all of the communities involved.
The goals of Barrio Adentro II include the creation of 600 Integral Diagnostic
Centers.37 These centers were expected to provide emergency care and intensive therapy
services 24 hours a day. 150 of the 600 total Integral Diagnostic Centers will have the
capability to perform emergency surgery. The centers should have provided diagnostic
services such as x-ray, echosonography, micro analytical systems for viral and congenital
diseases, electrocardiogram, and clinical ophthalmology. 38 The second phase planned to
construct one High-Technology Diagnostic Center in each state of the country, plus two
or three more centers in the larger states. The High-Tech Centers were planned to have
the newest diagnostic equipment that will allow for the detection and diagnosis of
diseases, including MRI machines, computerized axial tomography, tridimensional
ultrasound, mammography, bone densimetry tests, videoendoscopes, and clinical
laboratories.39 The government claimed it planned to construct 600 rehabilitation and
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physiotherapy centers to provide electrotherapy, thermotherapy, hydrotherapy,
occupational therapy, speech therapy, podiatry, and natural and traditional medicine.40
All of these machines are expensive and require constant maintenance. The
Venezuelan government pumped money into the creation of the different medical centers
and the required equipment, but it did not focus on future funds necessary to preserve the
facilities. While PDVSA had the funds to purchase the machines at the start of the
program, the economic turmoil the company has faced is causing the technology to be
left unattended. While Venezuela could provide the initial investments, the finances
necessary for upkeep were not a priority. The quick launch of Mission Barrio Adentro
was more beneficial to accomplish Hugo Chávez’s own objectives of gaining popular
support.
In order to address the health emergencies not protected under the first two phases
of Mission Barrio Adentro, the Venezuelan government created Barrio Adentro III. Its
goal was to improve, restructure and expand the infrastructure of the country’s 300
existing state-run hospitals. The plan included the addition of 18 clinics offering
radiotherapy and chemotherapy, targeting a coverage area of 85 percent of the
population.41 Next the government created Barrio Adentro IV, which included the
establishment of 12 new hospitals, each specializing in a different area of medicine, such
as toxicology, gastroenterology, and orthopedics. A derivative of Mission Barrio
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Adentro, the government formed Mission Milagro to treat cataracts and other visionrelated health problems. Mission Sonrisa was also a subsidiary of Barrio Adentro. Barrio
Adentro carried out many tooth extractions, leaving people in need of prosthetic teeth.
Mission Sonrisa provided dental prosthesis in the 140 clinics the government constructed
throughout Venezuela. Other than Cuban doctors and healthcare professionals, Cuba sent
teachers who specialize in sports, recreation, and physical well-being. Over 8,000 experts
in sports have come from Cuba to work in the neighborhoods accommodated by Barrio
Adentro.42 The government called the athletic program Barrio Adentro Sport. The many
names and layers the government created for the program implied success and
innovation. However, the constant additions to Barrio Adentro illustrate Chávez’s
impromptu policies, often created on an ad hoc basis.
Not everyone agreed with the implementation of Barrio Adentro, nor with the
plans it attempted to conduct. Most backlash by Hugo Chávez’s political opposition
objected to Cuban presence within the country. People also argued doctors, medical
products, technology, and pharmaceuticals from Cuba were of substandard caliber.
Occasionally public hospitals would deny entrance to patients of Barrio Adentro until
referrals became directed toward two hospitals that openly supported the program.
Surprisingly, the majority of criticism did not include disapproval of Barrio Adentro’s
financing mechanisms, which were extremely volatile and lacking in transparency.
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3.3 Financing
Imperative to the creation and application of the missions was Hugo Chávez’s
absolute control over the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
Approximately three years after the election of Chávez, employees of PDVSA engaged in
a two-month strike which led to the termination of almost twenty-thousand employees
and a drop in GDP of 27.6 percent by the first quarter of 2003. The Chávez government
capitalized on the strike, blaming the neoliberal opposition for causing the lockout that
left much of the population debilitated. According to the Chávez administration, the
company put “political and even financial interests above the interests of the nation.”
Chávez accused the oil corporation of hoarding large amounts of capital while the
education and health sectors became depleted.
By taking complete jurisdiction of PDVSA, Chávez could carry out his radical
agendas funded completely by the national oil company. While the world price of oil
steadily increased, the Chávez regime utilized the revenue of PDVSA to fund social
programs as well as provide highly subsidized crude to Latin American allies that share
similar anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist ideologies. PDVSA has essentially become a bank
in place of an oil company that the government drains to hold the support of the lower
class. It has disregarded all obligations to reinvest its revenues into research and
development, which has resulted in a steady decline in the company’s success. Overtime,
the stagnation of oil revenues has negatively affected funding for Chávez’s missions and
the quality of the economy as a whole.
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Funding mechanisms for Mission Barrio Adentro have been overly ambitious as
Venezuela faces falling oil prices and PDVSA revenues continue to decline. The value of
the bolivar has dropped rapidly, which has contributed to high levels of inflation within
the country. Increases of social contributions from PDVSA, despite the drop in revenues,
has essentially bankrupted the company as well as the country. It has led to the soaring
levels of inflation, which have caused the average Venezuelan’s quality of life to
plummet.
The agreement with Venezuela has been the most substantial medical cooperation
plan Cuba has tackled since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. The exchange of oil-fordoctors called for the distribution of “30,000 experts in medicine, 600 comprehensive
health clinics, 600 rehabilitation and physical therapy centers, 35 high technology
diagnostic centers, and 100,000 ophthalmologic surgeries, among other things.”43 In
exchange for Cuba’s expertise, Venezuela agreed to provide 53,000 barrels of petroleum
per day, even though the total at various points in time amount has exceeded 90,000
barrels of oil equivalent per day.44
Because the cost of Cuban medical aid is not valued as income, Venezuela does
not include it in its fiscal budget and its value is judged incorrectly. As a result, the value
of the oil Cuba receives is not comparable to the value of health services Cuba provides.
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Cuba does not have to adjust to the changing price of petroleum, which benefits the
country while oil prices remain high because the agreement is in terms of goods and
services versus monetary valuations.
The Venezuelan government does not publish documents detailing specific
mission expenditures or payments made to compensate Cuba for its services. However,
one may take into account the percentage of social spending as a percentage of GDP
versus international policy payments as a percentage of GDP to quantify expenditures.
From the late 1990s to 2005, social programs represented approximately 10 percent of
gross domestic product on average, which is equal to $5 billion U.S. dollars.45 Most
payments directed towards social spending come exclusively from non-budgetary
sources. One may conclude most financing arises through PDVSA, not through taxation
or government accounts. In 2015, the oil corporation increased its social contributions by
more than 72 percent, to $9.2 billion, despite its fall in revenues.46 International
expenditures reached 40 percent of GDP, or $20 billion, which also came from mainly
unconventional, non-budgetary sources.47 Total government health expenditure as a
percentage of GDP has maintained an average level of roughly five percent since the
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beginning of Barrio Adentro in 2003.48 That being said, the Venezuelan government has
spent more on international strategies than domestic initiatives. However, the steady rise
of oil prices up to 2008 and then again in 2009 has allowed for the increased spending on
social programs and the development of living standards for the poorest citizens of
Venezuela.

3.4 Chávez’s Medical Missions Fall Short
Mission Barrio Adentro has the appearance of a social program created to provide
primary medical care to the poorest areas of Venezuela. However, the plan has done little
except for provide an incentive for impoverished citizens to support Chávez and his
Bolivarian regime. Mission Barrio Adentro has failed to meet its original targets. Less
than half of the planned primary care facilities have been constructed.49 By May of 2007,
only 2,708 modules were built while another 3,284 modules had yet to be completed.50
The financing for the modules came exclusively from a $126.5 million investment from
PDVSA, resulting in an average cost of over $46,000 per module.51 Coming entirely from
oil revenues, the $46,000 to fund each module seems excessive because for the
government, land does not cost anything. As a result of Chávez’s 2001 land law, the
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government has seized thousands of acres of land to use as it sees fit.52 Of the centers that
the government has constructed, very few of them have the capabilities to stay open.
Approximately 30 percent of the medical units remain unstaffed due to a doctor shortage
throughout the entire country, which has left only one doctor available for every 3,000
Venezuelans.53 The original goal of Barrio Adentro was to provide approximately one
doctor for every 1,200 citizens.54 In 2006, 4,000 Cuban doctors left Venezuela to
participate in similar medical diplomacy programs in countries like Bolivia and Brazil
despite Cuba continuing to receive oil and financial support from Venezuela.55 Even if
the Cuban doctors stayed in Venezuela, the country would still not have a sufficient
number of medical professionals to adequately attend to its citizens. Despite the
educational aspects of Mission Barrio Adentro, Venezuelan doctors have yet to replace
the Cuban doctors entirely. Although the program began with the intention of phasing
out Cuban doctors for Venezuelan doctors, some have criticized the quality of education
received by the Venezuelan medical students. While Venezuela continues to give
substantial support to Cuba, the mission has failed to generate medical graduates and has
consistently fallen short of achieving original goals and expectations.
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Even after the actions Barrio Adentro has supposedly carried out, much of the
Venezuelan population is dissatisfied with the caliber of its public health services. In
2014, 63.6 percent of Venezuelans felt displeased with healthcare provided by the state.56
In fact, dissatisfaction with medical services has surpassed the dissatisfaction with
corruption of public officials, which has exacerbated opposition to the current
Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro.
Venezuela is currently undergoing the worst economic crisis it has experienced in
its history. Because of the crisis, infant mortality and deaths of Venezuelans with curable
illnesses has increased. The death rate among babies under a month old rose over 100
percent, from .02 percent in 2012 to two percent in 2015.57 Hospitals do not have enough
money to purchase antibiotics, bandages, or food. Patients can only purchase life-saving
cancer medications on the black market and doctors perform surgeries without gloves,
soap, or water.58 Hospitals have discharged patients undergoing cardiology complications
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due to a scarcity of medical supplies, such as catheters, working blood-processing
machines, and heart valves.59
Although Mission Barrio Adentro has constructed hospitals and provided the
initial medical devices needed for the program, the lack of maintenance has left the
centers completely unusable. Of 45,000 hospital beds within the government’s public
hospitals, doctors can utilize 16,300.60 Of the $1 billion necessary to purchase medical
imports, the government supplied less than $200 million in 2014 compared to the $807
million it provided in 2010.61 Despite years of economic strength as a result of high oil
prices, budgetary mishandling of the government through programs such as Barrio
Adentro created an unsustainable process of financing, slowly causing medical funding to
wither away.
While oil prices remained high, the government could provide poor Venezuelans
with sufficient public medical care through Mission Barrio Adentro. However, when oil
prices fell, the government blamed the neoliberal activities of the political opposition and
the capitalist nature of the energy industry. The government under Nicolas Maduro has
even called the doctors of the public hospitals conspirators in the current healthcare crisis.
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Maduro has continued exorbitant spending on welfare programs, such as Barrio Adentro,
even though the means to do so are nonexistent.
The Venezuelan economic crisis has greatly impacted the Cuban government as
well as the Cuban doctors working as part of the Barrio Adentro mission. Venezuelan
crude and its derivatives accounted for 78 percent of Cuba’s total consumption in 2009.62
The value of Venezuelan oil and grants form over 10 percent of Cuban GDP.63 The
decrease in prices has led Venezuela to cut back on shipments to Cuba. Venezuelan
shipments of crude fell almost 20 percent at the beginning of 2016, which has caused
Cuba to greatly reduce its electricity and fuel consumption.64 Because of the Venezuelan
government's inability to provide funding for research and development, PDVSA does
not have the capabilities to extract the large amounts of oil beneath the country, leading
to a decrease in shipments made to Cuba. Due to the movement of oil revenues into
social programs instead of recirculation of funds back into the company, refineries
similar to the Cienfuegos refinery in Cuba have been forced to shut down or pause
production. The 65,000 barrels per day refinery has been performing at its minimum
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output capacity of 50,000 barrels per day due to servicing problems.65 Despite the fact
that Cuba’s economy greatly relies on Venezuelan imports, Cuba has survived worse. If
Venezuela experiences complete collapse, Cuba’s real GDP could contract 7 to 10
percent.66 Relative to the economic crisis following the fall of the Soviet Union,
Venezuela’s impact would be minor, especially now when the United States has begun
working towards normalizing relations with the island.
While the Cuban government may survive Venezuela’s economic crisis, Cuban
doctors working for Mission Barrio Adentro may not. The current economic and political
catastrophe in the South American country has caused many of the remaining Cuban
health experts to seek protection in other countries, often immigrating to the United
States through a special application process. Originally, the Cuban doctors went to
Venezuela to work for Mission Barrio Adentro because they believed it would provide
better opportunities than staying in their home country. While working in Venezuela, the
Cuban officials provide each medical professional with an allowance of 3,000 bolivares,
equal to about U.S. $3, plus an extra U.S. $29 per month deposited into a Cuban
controlled bank account.67 The large amount of inflation in Venezuela has caused the
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bolivar to lose almost all of its value, causing the doctors to struggle to survive. The
Cubans also fear losing their job if officials suspect them of denouncing the program.
Under the Cuban Medical Professional Parole program that provides visas to Cuban
healthcare experts, over 2,000 applications were received in 2015.68 Other Cubans often
flee to Colombia from Venezuela. Of the illegal immigrants detained in Colombia from
January to July of 2014, 42 percent were Cuban.69
The Cuban doctors not only fear the economic stresses of working in Venezuela,
but the physical danger as well. Violence within the country has escalated and medical
professionals have accused the Venezuelan government of concealing violent crimes
against Cuban doctors, even murder. Between 2003 and 2010, 68 Cuban doctors were
killed in Venezuela.70 Chávez did call for an increase in the protection of Cuban
doctors.71 However, this was because it benefited him politically to keep Cuban doctors
working in Venezuela. The doctors provided more than just medical services to
Venezuelans. Government handlers reportedly forced the doctors to attend government
parades, monitor the political beliefs of their patients, and tell people that Barrio Adentro
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would discontinue if they did not vote for Chávez.72 The threat to the Cuban doctors as
well as their role in promoting Chávez’s political views caused many to leave the
program and defect to the United States or surrounding countries.
Cost inefficiency has been a major problem in the Barrio Adentro program. Barrio
Adentro costs approximately $10 billion a year to execute and the city of Caracas pays
Cuba an extra $5.4 billion a year for the continued employment of the Cuban doctors and
medical professionals.73 The Cuban government also receives oil subsidies through the
Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement with Venezuela. The payments given to Cuba
fund room and board, provide a stipend to the Cuban doctors and supply a small income
for the doctor’s Cuban family. The Cuban government does not disclose how it utilizes
the remaining portion of the payments from Venezuela. While Venezuela reportedly pays
$5,000 a month to each doctor or medical expert, the actual amount the Cubans receive is
sometimes less than $100.74 While obtaining large sums of oil from Venezuela that is
later sold for profit, the Cuban government retains most of the money it receives instead
of giving it to the doctors.
The inadequate salaries the doctors receive within Cuba have led many to start
their own private, and sometimes illegal, practices. The two best hospitals on the island

72

Ibid.
Ibid., 18.
74
Ibid.
73

35

are for-profit, but doctors also provide healthcare on the black-market.75 For example,
surgeons, who make less than $20 a month from the state, have begun providing breast
augmentations in order to receive more money.76 The relaxation of economic restrictions
has caused many doctors to pursue more economically advantageous procedures without
the state’s knowledge. If more doctors chose to participate in such actions, the number of
people who will be willing to practice abroad is likely to decrease drastically and
missions such as Barrio Adentro will continue to suffer as the numbers of doctors in
Venezuela continue to decrease.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion

Similar to the economic depression Venezuela encountered in the 1980’s and
1990’s, the current financial, social, and political crisis could have been avoided if the
government stopped depending so heavily on oil revenue. Although easier said than done,
it should have diversified the economy and created efficient and transparent social
programs to support the Venezuelan citizens. Missions, such as Mission Barrio Adentro,
appeared to provide organized and effective care because of the information provided by
the government. Hugo Chávez claimed the first phase of Barrio Adentro was a success,
so he initiated the second, third, and fourth phases. The population perceived the constant
additions and supposed upgrades to the mission as progress. However, the billions of
dollars put into the program did not develop it to the extent the government had said it
would.
The unproductive and often nefarious financing of Mission Barrio Adentro
supplied Cuba with substantial amounts of oil, despite the fact that its government
constructed medical centers that stand mostly vacant and supplied thousands of medical
supplies without proper maintenance mechanisms. The Venezuelan government provided
a large amount of oil to Cuba on a daily basis in exchange for medical personnel as a
Latin American subsidy strategy, promoting socialist messages and a reliance on
Venezuela’s oil contributions. The dependence of ALBA member countries, including
Cuba, on Venezuelan oil appealed to the government, until Venezuela began to feel the
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effects of low gas prices and countries discontinued aid or could not repay the
government.
The large amounts of financial support provided by Venezuela combined with the
inefficiency and financial mishandling by the government has obstructed Mission Barrio
Adentro from achieving any significant success. The Venezuelan government has instead
exhausted revenues from PDVSA to fund the Cuban government and gain political
support from impoverished Venezuelans by claiming the program could solve the health
crisis. The overuse of the government’s oil revenues during a time when the commodity’s
price was strong left little room to handle a decline in government savings. As a
consequence, the quality of Venezuelan healthcare has deteriorated even more so than the
healthcare crisis in the 90’s that left 70 percent of the population without access to
medical services.
Overall, the Venezuelan government is to blame for creating an ineffective social
program, which relied heavily on unsustainable forms of financing and inefficient courses
of action. The main goal of the program has been to gain support from poor Venezuelan
citizens instead of providing sustainable and effective healthcare to the population. Cuban
medical experts existed as living propaganda for the Venezuelan regime. The Cuban
government did not have to uphold its obligations under Mission Barrio Adentro because
the Venezuelan government did not hold it accountable for its substandard medical
practices. Promotion of Chávez’s administration was just as important, if not more
important, than the successful execution of Mission Barrio Adentro.
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Venezuela faces the largest economic decline and the second highest murder rate
in the world. The inflation rate is expected to reach 2,200 percent by the end of 2017.77
All of these problems come together in the Venezuelan hospitals, where people sleep on
dirty beds, machines are broken, and medicine is nearly impossible to find. Patients have
arrived in hospitals with diseases such as diphtheria, which Venezuela supposedly
eradicated over 20 years ago.78 Maternal mortality rates offer important indications of a
country’s human development and healthcare services. Even before the economic crisis
began in Venezuela, Barrio Adentro did not improve maternal mortality rates within the
country. After Chávez’s re-election, maternal mortality rates began to rise. The level
currently stands at 112, which is the same as the rate 50 years ago.79 A 2014 report on a
children’s hospital located in Caracas found out of 11 areas of the hospital, 10 did not
provide satisfactory resources because of limited medical professionals, equipment and
supplies.80
While the reasoning behind Mission Barrio Adentro was promising, the political
characteristics Chávez created to gain popular support permeated the entirety of the
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program and hindered its success. The 1999 Constitution gave everyone the right to
adequate healthcare. However, the government never made Mission Barrio Adentro part
of the national healthcare system. It alternatively became a program of international
diplomacy with Cuba, funded by oil wealth, which exhausted national accounts and
created Venezuela’s current economic disaster.
The future of Venezuela as well as Mission Barrio Adentro is uncertain. Both
founders of the healthcare program have died, and both Venezuela and Cuba face radical
change in their futures. Cuban leadership following Raul Castro, who is currently 85
years old, is unclear. As the privatization of medical practices in Cuba increase, Cuban
medical diplomacy could come to a complete standstill, as doctors no longer find the
opportunity appealing.
In Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro could face a recall referendum. However, to do so
the opposition must collect signatures from at least 20 percent of the voting population,
which amounts to 4 million people, before they may schedule the referendum.81 If the
referendum is held in 2016, a presidential election will take place. If it is called for 2017,
the vice president, Aristóbulo Istúriz, will replace Maduro and most likely maintain
similar practices as the current administration.82 Even with these changes, the
restructuring of Mission Barrio Adentro and Venezuela’s healthcare system as a whole
would take time. For long-term adjustments in improving the overall economic state of
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the country, the Venezuelan government should work towards privatizing PDVSA, which
would reduce the company to solely hydrocarbon exploration and extraction versus its
current responsibility of funding Venezuela’s social initiatives. However, this action may
not prove successful until governmental volatility recovers to ensure confidence in
PDVSA’s transition. To alleviate the current medical crisis in Venezuela, the government
must primarily provide medicine and supplies to the population. Doing so would require
foreign financing and an increase in drug manufacturing. The funding of healthcare must
be restructured to more efficiently provide for the population. The government must also
provide mechanisms to decrease reliance on Cuban medical personnel by increasing
incentives to practice as a doctor. Not only did Mission Barrio Adentro siphon money
from government funds to pay Cuba for ineffective healthcare, it kept Venezuelans from
studying medicine. The ability for Cuba to continue receiving oil payments so Chávez
could maintain his ally was a more attractive plan than replacing Cuban doctors with
Venezuelans. The superfluous spending to fund missions like Barrio Adentro bankrupted
PDVSA and did not result in an improved healthcare system for impoverished
Venezuelans. Instead, Cuban and Venezuelan healthcare diplomacy resulted in the
humanitarian crisis the country currently experiences.
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